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SHAKING LOOSE FROM AN OLD
JURISPRUDENCE: WHAT IS THE PRICE?
by
James E. Herget*
[The positivist's] picture of law as a system of rules has exercised a
tenacious hold on our imagination, perhaps through its very simplic-
ity. If we shake ourselves loose from this model of rules, we may be
able to build a model truer to the complexity and sophistication of our
own practices.'
HAKING loose from a firmly held point of view 2 opens new vistas
that can logically lead to theretofore unsuspected conclusions. We
are sometimes uncomfortable with the new conclusions. If we are
intellectually honest, however, we must be willing to work out all of the
ramifications of a new theoretical framework.
This Article endeavors to explain why the modern theory of law (also
called positivism, analytical jurisprudence, formalism, the normative sci-
ence of law, or the pure theory of law) has remained the dominant point of
view in spite of devastating criticism from many quarters during the past
century. The intent is to establish that the modern theory is in actuality a
part of political ideology and that therein lies its staying power. Section II
frames this argument by tracing the historical origins of the modern theory
and its development alongside the evolution of classic political liberalism.
This section also explores the logical connections between the two doc-
trines. Section III discusses the institutionalization of the modern theory,
and section IV briefly examines the phenomenon of appropriation of the
modern theory by nonliberal political regimes. Finally, section V ad-
dresses the implications of rejecting the modern theory.
Section I initiates the discussion by taking note of a longstanding intel-
lectual battle in jurisprudential circles between legal skeptics and legal for-
malists. The skeptics' criticism of formalism is accepted as effective for
purposes of this Article, although most skeptics have offered little or noth-
ing by way of a substitute theory. This criticism raises the question of why
the formalist theory has continued to be the accepted model of a legal
* A.B., J.D., University of Illinois; S.J.D., University of Virginia. Professor of Law,
University of Houston.
1. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 45 (1977).
2. "Shaking loose" is a better term than the more pretentious "becoming enlightened,"
or the more fashionable "raising one's consciousness" traceable to the Marxist notion of
class consciousness.
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system in the twentieth century and why alternative proposals have largely
been ignored.
I. FORMALISTS VERSUS RULE SKEPTICS AND OTHER CRITICS:
STATING THE PROBLEM
For roughly the past one hundred years, a jurisprudential war has been
fought over what counts as law and how judges decide cases according to
law. 3 The two proponents in this battle may be characterized as the for-
malists and the skeptics. The formalists' position was well established by
the end of the nineteenth century and remains the prevalent jurisprudence
in the world today.4 It has been, however, the subject of criticism by skep-
tics for a long time.
Historically, the skepticism seems to have begun in Germany. In the
late nineteenth century a leading formalist, von Ihering, began to have
grave doubts about the prevailing jurisprudential views.5 At the turn of
the century the German scholar Eugen Ehrlich, led by similar misgivings
about the formal science of law, determined to found a "second science" of
law, which would be called the sociology of law. 6 Roscoe Pound was the
eminent advocate of that view in this country.7 In the early decades of the
twentieth century a group of German scholars known as the Freirecht-
schule espoused a general skepticism toward the power of legal rules to
determine judicial decision-making.8 A comparable group of American
thinkers known as the legal realists advanced many of the same views in
the 1920s and 1930s. 9 The criticism has continued to the present time.
The central problem focused upon by both the formalists and the skeptics,
which put them into direct conflict, was the question of how judges decide
cases according to law.
3. What counts as law and the method judges use to decide cases according to law are
not the only questions debated in modem jurisprudence, perhaps not even the most impor-
tant ones; but in one form or another they have remained the most persistent issues.
4. The formalists' position has been called the "ruling theory of law." See R. DWOR-
KIN, supra note I, at vii. The classic exposition of the positivist theory in the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition is J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). The
leading German theorist has been Hans Kelsen. See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND THE STATE (1949); H. KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (trans. M. Knight
1934-1935). A recent English variation of Kelsen's work is J. HARRIS, LAW AND LEGAL
SCIENCE (1979). Probably the most powerful exposition to date is H.L.A. HART, THE CON-
CEPT OF LAW (1961). For a general discussion and critique of the modern theory of law, see
D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 170-343 (4th ed. 1979).
5. See H. VAN EIKEMA HOMMES, MAJOR TRENDS IN THE HISTORY OF LEGAL PHILOS-
OPHY 204-17 (1979).
6. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1913), re-
printedin THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 437 (C. Morris ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
C. Morris].
7. R. POUND, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1941), reprinted in C. Morris, supra note 6, at
532.
8. See Kaufman & Hassemer, Enacted Law and Judicial Decision in German Jurispru-
dential Thought, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 461, 474 (1959).
9. See W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM AND THE JU-




From the positivist or formal viewpoint the judge is required to ascer-
tain the facts and then subsume them under the appropriate legal rule or
principle.' 0 In most cases this task is relatively simple. In difficult cases
the judge has to use the rational tools of analysis and exegesis to find the
correct rule. Judicial decisions are criticized as correct or incorrect, de-
pending upon whether the judge's premises are properly or improperly se-
lected and whether his reasoning is sound or fallacious. Judges rely on
assistance from legal scholars to assure that their reasoning and conclu-
sions are correct.
From the skeptic's point of view this position is mostly nonsense.''
True, some cases might be so simple that legal rules can be applied
mechanically. In most cases, however, the judge must make personal
value judgments in ascertaining the facts and in finding the applicable rule
of law. Rules of law are plentiful and often come in paired opposites. No
authoritative guide to picking rules exists other than the judge's intuition
and his own sense of fairness. Some skeptics have claimed that a clever
judge can decide a case in accordance with his own preference and then
can devise a formal rationalization for his decision that would please a
positivist. Rules of law do not make judicial decisions predictable, al-
though decisions can be rationalized in terms of acceptable doctrine. Cer-
tainty in the law and fidelity to the legislative will are illusions.
These two extreme positions cannot both be right. The skeptics have
convincingly demonstrated that judicial decisions are not "determined" by
the positive law. On the other hand, the formalists have shown that judi-
cial decisions cannot be "valid" unless they conform to the positive law.
This puzzle of adjudication has been the central battleground in a long-
standing jurisprudential war.
While the skeptical criticism squarely hit its mark, 12 the legal skeptics
were not the only ones to question the modern view of law. Students of
the Anglo-American common law had for a long time raised serious ques-
tions about the judicial process. 13 How could unelected judges make law
through precedent without subverting the democratic process? The stan-
10. Of course, this statement of the positivist position on the question is simplified and
generalized. Undoubtedly, each individual positivist theoretician would give a different ac-
count. The textual statement is, however, representative and accurate enough for present
purposes.
11. Again, a generalized and simplified statement is given.
12. This position will not be reargued here. Some of the main criticisms are summa-
rized in section V infra. Readers are further referred to various writings in collections of
jurisprudence under the headings of legal realism, legal skepticism, or judicial process. See
e.g., D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 451-564. Two of the most persuasive expositions are:
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967) (reprinted as ch. 2 of his book,
Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 1); Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE
L.J. 411 (1968). The skeptical criticism has been mostly negative. Few skeptics have made
alternative proposals. In fairness, however, no claims to advancing a comprehensive philos-
ophy were made by the American legal realists, See Llewellyn, Some Realism about Real-
ism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931), reprintedin K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 42-53 (1962).
13. See E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 571-77 (1953).
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dard positivist explanation of this power of courts was that the legislature
delegated such power. 14 Since no express delegation could be found in
past legislative pronouncements, it was regarded as implied or as the result
of an implicit rule of recognition. In the United States the Federal Consti-
tution and many state constitutions expressly placed the judicial power in
the court system.15 The judicial power could be and was construed to in-
clude the power to make law by stare decisis. This attempt to bring judi-
cial lawmaking into the ambit of the positivist model was reinforced by the
notion that judges could make law only interstitially or within a narrow
area between the broader confines of legislative policy, as well as by the
admitted fact that the legislature can always change judge-made law. 16
Nevertheless, this rationalization was suspect for a long time and became
especially difficult to accept when United States courts thwarted congres-
sional and state legislative policy in constitutional cases. 17
In addition, beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, students of society sought to emulate the successful natural sciences
by adopting their "scientific" methods, as they were then perceived.' 8 Lu-
minaries such as Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, and others attempted to
establish a science of society which was not teleological but scientifically
objective. Knowledge of human society would be obtained from empirical
observation leading to hypotheses, theories, and possible laws of human
behavior. No a priori principles or assumptions would be admitted.
Traditional political theory, since it included normative assumptions,
would have to be rejected as nonscientific. The nonempirical, positivist
view of law would have to be replaced. Apparent advances in psychology,
sociology, economics, and anthropology led to optimism that a society
could be studied and understood through a naturalist, objective, opera-
tional, and quantified method. Thus, methodological considerations
reached a state of sophistication in the scholarly world that called into
question the accepted jurisprudence.
A few legal scholars have made a serious attempt to engage in the scien-
14. See Har's analysis of Austin's struggle with this problem. H.L.A. HART, supra note
4, at 43-48. Austin suggested that the sovereign gave tacit commands. Hart's own resolution
of this problem suggests that nations in the common law tradition follow a "rule of recogni-
tion" that allocates to courts the power to make law in cases not covered by legislation or
prior precedent. Id. at 98. Whether Hart's explanation is any more persuasive than Austin's
is debatable.
15. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § I; TEX. CONST. ant. V, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
16. The legislature, of course, cannot change judge-made law in the more complicated
case of constitutional interpretation in the United States under the doctrine of judicial re-
view. In this circumstance the electorate must look to constitutional amendment to rectify
mistakes of the judiciary and has done so at least twice. See U.S. CONST. amends. Xl, XVI.
17. The classic example is treated in most constitutional law casebooks under the head-
ing of "substantive due process." See, e.g., W. LOCKHART, V. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420-79 (5th ed. 1980); see also R. Mc-
CLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960), for an elaboration of the theme that the
Supreme Court institutionalized our natural law heritage while the legislatures institutional-
ized our democratic heritage, thus permitting the American political mind to be
schizophrenic.
18. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 13-115 (1973).
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tific study of law by using empirical techniques. Perhaps the high point of
this movement in America was the creation of the Law Institute at Johns
Hopkins University in 1928.19 Traditional legal scholars responded to
these empirical attempts with attitudes ranging from encouragement to
contempt. Down to the present time scholarship of this type has been but
a small part of the vast bulk of scholarly discourse in the law reviews, legal
treatises, and texts, despite funding and encouragement from the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation 20 and other national funding agencies.
The theory under which these studies have been carried out remains
obscure. Some sociological work appears to rely upon the traditional prin-
ciples of the philosophy of science.2 ' In other cases the positivist view of
law seems to be assumed. Indeed, much of this interdisciplinary work cre-
ates some serious confusion of aims and methodology. 22
In addition to fostering a more scientific effort to explain law and legal
systems, the skeptical critique moved in two other directions. The first
move was to substitute a rough and ready pragmatism for the modern the-
ory. This pragmatic viewpoint sees law as merely a word and arguments
about its definition as futile. Lawyering alone is important. Lawyers need
to know how to practice an art. Skill in advocacy is the principal subject
matter for the law school curriculum. This sort of pragmatism is, of
course, no theory at all; it is simply an attitude. While widespread, this
attitude presents no serious intellectual challenge to the modern theory of
law.
The other noteworthy development arising from the early skepticism is
the jurisprudence of Lasswell and McDougal. An adequate description or
critique of that jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this discussion. 23 Suf-
fice it to say that in many ways the Lasswell-McDougal approach is a
striking departure from the modern theory of law and presents a real, af-
firmative alternative. It has not, however, gained many adherents, proba-
bly for the reasons adduced later in this paper.24
The juristic developments just recounted failed to make a significant im-
pact upon the general acceptance of the modern theory of law. That the-
ory also came under attack from outside the world of legal scholarship on
19. See W. TWINING, supra note 9, at 52-53.
20. The Bar Foundation has been active in promoting empirical research and publishes
a journal devoted primarily to that type of scholarship. See I AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
iii (1976) (introduction to the journal).
21. See, e.g., A. RYAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970).
22. See Black, The Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086, 1086-87 (1972).
23. For some representative statements of the Lasswell-McDougal system, see Lasswell
& McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362 (1971); McDougal,
Jurisprudencefor a Free Society, I GA. L. REV. 1 (1966); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Edu-
cation and Public Policy. Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. 203
(1943).
24. A symposium on the 25th anniversary of the publication of Lasswell and McDou-
gal's revolutionary 1943 proposals for legal education, supra note 23, can be found in 54 VA.
L. REV. 583 (1968). The authors contributing to this symposium attempt to explain why the
Lasswell-McDougal proposal and other Lasswell-McDougal ideas never caught on in the
world of legal scholarship.
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a number of grounds. 25 These criticisms, some of them penetrating, have
also failed to dislodge the modem theory from its preeminence. Why does
the positivist theoretical structure continue to stand in spite of the obvious
cracks in the walls? Or, to change the metaphor, why can't we shake
loose?
II. THE MODERN THEORY OF LAW AS AN IDEOLOGICAL APPENDAGE
A. Ideology and Jurisprudence
To minimize ambiguity an elaboration of what is meant by the term
"political ideology" follows. A political ideology is a framework of think-
ing about certain aspects of society. Political aspects of society include the
exercise of power, coercion, or authority by persons or groups within the
society. Ideology means an integrated set of concepts that are, for the most
part, logically consistent and mutually supportive. A political ideology is,
then, the set of ideas and vocabulary by which we organize, understand,
explain, and evaluate political phenomena.26 Although, in a sense, polit-
ical theorists are the architects of political ideology, the term is much
broader than theory alone or the theory of a single thinker such as Montes-
quieu or Bentham. At any given time in history, a political ideology is
subscribed to by a large number of people, including ordinary laymen as
well as social scientists. It may not be perfectly understood, and all its
ramifications may not be realized, but it can be taught and passed on to
others through education, propaganda, and simple emulation of ongoing
practices. Language eventually assimilates a political ideology. The
meanings of "judge," "constitutional right," and "sovereign" imply certain
notions about how society is or should be organized and conducted.
Words become "theory impregnated. '27
25. Anthropologists have asserted that the modem theory is an ethnocentric folk system
peculiar to western countries. See L. POSPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW 1-7 (2d ed. 1978).
Historians and social scientists have deplored the narrow view of legal change that the mod-
em theory requires. See 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: I-RULES AND
ORDER 35-46, 72-89 (1973). Sociologists have noted the modern view's failure to explain
legal compliance and noncompliance. See J. MERRYMAN & D. CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW:
WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 355-90 (1978). Another area
of severe frustration and puzzlement in the world of legal scholarship caused by the modem
theory of law is the problem of administrative discretion. Administrative agencies appar-
ently violate the separation of powers doctrine, combine policymaking with adjudication,
often act with relatively little statutory authorization or limitation, and otherwise behave in
ways difficult to analyze in the framework of the modem theory of law. See generally K.
DAvIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).
26. The notion of ideology, traceable through Marx to the intellectuals of the French
Revolution, is extremely complicated. At least two schools of thought contemplate the rela-
tionship between ideology and social theory. One holds that all social theory is ideology,
that we are forever trapped in our own point of view and cannot escape it. The other holds
that a method that strives for objectivity and constant empirical verification can gradually
lead us beyond our cultural limitations and we can approximate true objective reality in
social theory. See G. LICHTHEIM, THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY 3-46 (1967); A. RYAN, supra
note 21, at 220-40; Rudden, Law and Ideology in the Soviet Union, 31 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 189 (1978).
27. The suggestive term "theory impregnated" is taken from P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A
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The historically important political ideologies, including the liberal syn-
thesis, have a dual aspect. They are both descriptive and prescriptive. 28
The concepts that the ideology uses and integrates describe both what soci-
ety is and what it should be. In the view of the liberal synthesis, for exam-
ple, the lawmaking power of a society is and should be vested in the
legislature, or in persons accountable to the public at large. If a society is
found in which some other person or group appears to be exercising law-
making power, then that exercise must be explained as either an express or
implied delegation of power from the legislature or as an illegal usurpation
of power. This amalgamation of prescriptive and descriptive functions, so
characteristic of ancient Greek thought, has been a source of serious con-
fusion in jurisprudence. 29
At this point the relationship of political ideology to jurisprudence re-
mains to be expounded. Contextually, the term jurisprudence means an
explanation or theory of law. 30 In the ordinary affairs of life there is no
mystery about what is meant by law or a legal system. Everyone is famil-
iar with lawsuits, court houses, law books, traffic tickets, lawyer's fees, sen-
ate bills, and judicial robes. Jurisprudence seeks logically to organize
these legal phenomena, to generalize about them, to connect them to other
areas within our understanding, and to give insight into them. Obviously,
however, legal phenomena are social and political phenomena, a subcat-
egory of human interaction in general and of that part of human interac-
tion that involves coercion and authority. Therefore, in order to explain
law in a useful or meaningful way, it has traditionally been neceesary to
use concepts that are compatible with those that are generally used to un-
derstand society or political activity. Jurisprudence, therefore, has tended
to be the application or extension of political ideology to legal phenomena.
B. Intellectual Sources of the Liberal Synthesis
A number of political ideologies have preceded the liberal synthesis in
western society. Of particular importance was Thomism, a prevailing
viewpoint in the late medieval period.3' Thomas Aquinas, of course, was
concerned with the explanation of natural law, divine law, and human law
in the context of his great schematic integration of Aristotelian and Chris-
tian thought. His successful system became the main framework for intel-
lectual Christendom. The coming of the Reformation broke the unity of
the church, offered new theologies, and thereby raised new questions about
the relationship of God and social institutions. Because of the divisions
SOCIAL SCIENCE 124 (1958) (quoting from Gilbert Ryle). Winch's work has become a philo-
sophical classic.
28. See E. PATrERSON, supra note 13, at 117-46.
29. For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Black, supra note 22, at 1086.
30. Juridical or legal theory is a less parochial term since the equivalent of the English
jurisprudence in romance languages means case law or judge-made law. The text makes
clear, however, that the discussion does not address case law. For a concise description of
jurisprudence, see D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 1-18.
31. See A. D'ENTRItVEs, THE MEDIEVAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1959); T. GILBY, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS (1958).
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within Christendom, achieving a consensus regarding the justification of
political power on the basis of religious doctrine became impossible.
These divisions opened the way for various versions of secular natural law
and state of nature theories. Successful challenges to the King's power in
England prompted influential secular justifications for governmental
power by both Hobbes32 and Locke. 33 This ideology based upon secular
natural law was the forerunner of the liberal synthesis.
This is not to say, of course, that the liberal synthesis was sympathetic to
previous theory. Indeed, the chief motivation for the formulation of lib-
eral principles and the modem theory of law was probably a reaction to
older views that were seen as justifications for unjust social relationships.
Illustrative of this reaction was Bentham's vitriolic condemnation of the
notions of natural rights and natural law that had been so comfortable to
Locke and Jefferson. 34
Advances in science build upon the work of previous scientists. In con-
trast, each philosopher or political scientist is thought by many to build his
own castle from the ground up. This thinking, however, is untrue. While
social theorists have usually begun anew in constructing their theory, often
in reaction to prior theory, they have been willing to borrow ideas from
earlier writers when those ideas served a useful purpose within their own
framework of thinking. Similarly, in the creation of the liberal synthesis a
number of ideas first proposed in earlier times became incorporated in the
ultimate framework. Thus, the liberal synthesis had many architects.
35
The mention of theoretical architects should not mislead us into think-
ing that the liberal synthesis is merely a matter of intellectual or academic
concern. This set of complementary ideas has had a powerful effect on the
way government and law has been perceived and judged by politicians,
lawyers, officials, judges, commentators, and teachers. The vocabulary
that we have traditionally used to discuss political, constitutional, and le-
32. Hobbes wrote Leviathan in 1651 and De Give in 1642 principally to justify the re-
turn of the monarchy during the English Civil War and to justify a strong government. See
S. LAMPRECHT, INTRODUCTION TO T. HOBBES, DE CIVE OR THE CITIZEN xv (1949); see also
J. RANDALL, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIND 185-88 (1940).
33. Commentators generally regard parts of Locke's Second Treatise, in J. LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690), as the justification for the Parliament dominated sys-
tem of government that evolved in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. See G.
CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 212-17
(1973); see also J. RANDALL, supra note 32, at 341-49.
34. Bentham called the doctrine of natural rights embodied in Locke's writings and the
American Declaration of Independence "nonsense upon stilts." D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at
172 n.9.
35. Space will permit the acknowledgement of only a few of the leading thinkers and
their contributions. Grotius, Bodin, and Hobbes developed and used the concept of sover-
eignty. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau explained the social contract while Jefferson and Ad-
ams sought to effectuate it. Locke and Montesquieu elaborated upon the idea of separation
of powers. Following the lead of Descartes, a long line of rationalist and enlightenment
philosophers taught that society could be designed, and Bentham identified legislation as the
grand instrument for such design. A notion familiar in medieval times was put to new uses
at the end of the eighteenth century as the rule of law. Through the federalist papers
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay advocated the practical application of many of these ideas. See
generally, J. RANDALL, supra note 32, at 172-202, 334-64.
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gal questions mirrors the ideology. The powerful grip that the liberal syn-
thesis holds upon contemporary thinking is largely due to the logical
consistency of its major subconcepts supported by the subtle connotations
of political rhetoric. 36
1789 provides a convenient date to mark the emergence of the liberal
synthesis as a recognized ideology. That year witnessed the beginning of
the French Revolution and the adoption of the United States Constitution,
both events institutionalizing many of the ideas of the synthesis. Theorists
refined the ramifications of the ideology in the following half century
while the basic attitudinal framework spread throughout Europe and the
Americas.
C. Components of the Liberal Synthesis
The pole-star of the liberal synthesis, as the name might suggest, was the
idea of freedom.37 The American Revolution, the French Revolution, and
the many revolutions that followed in nineteenth century Europe and
Latin America all sought to overthrow existing regimes regarded as illegiti-
mately suppressing the freedom of the individual. The individual sought
to destroy the special privileges and powers of the nobility, the church, and
the King and to alleviate the coercive power of these feudal institutions.
Under the new order individual freedom was to be maximized, and no one
could be involuntarily subjected to the coercive power of another. From
this basic notion a number of consequences flowed.
Proceeding from the idea of individual freedom, the liberal synthesis
can be conveniently analyzed into four interrelated component concepts:
the republican principle, the legal monopoly principle, the design princi-
ple, and the rule of law. Together these concepts constitute the political
ideology that has been predominant in western thought for almost two
hundred years.
The republican principle is an extension of the idea of the social con-
tract. The social contract was the secular natural law philosopher's solu-
tion to the problem of justifying the coercive power of government,
including the enforcement of the law. The justification was based upon
consent. How did society know that its people would consent to abide by
rules, to pay taxes, etc.? The original argument, in its simplest form, was
that rational persons would agree that a society that imposed a government
36. See P. WINCH, supra note 27; see also Rudden, supra note 26, at 204, where the
author states: "The ideology first describes things as they are; this leads to rules; and the
latter include a duty to believe the description. Once this is done the system is sewn up." Id.
37. On liberal revolutionary ideology generally, see H. LASI, THE RISE OF EUROPEAN
LIBERALISM (1936); W. ORTON, THE LIBERAL TRADITION (1945); G. RUGGIERO, THE His-
TORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (1927). See also W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 477-510
(3d ed. 1953). The narrative that follows is a composite elaboration of the main features of
classic political liberalism. It is intended to be representative of liberal thinking generally,
not a summary of some individual theorist's view. Classic liberal economic theory, while
certainly a part of the nineteenth century political liberal's Weltanschauung, has not been




with coercive power would be more stable and more enduring than a soci-
ety without a government. The republican principle extended this argu-
ment and required the citizenry as voters to select those persons who
would make governmental policy through the electoral process. Thus,
under the republican principle the authority and legitimacy of law and all
governmental power is derived from the people acting through their
elected spokesmen. No coercive power can be legitimately exercised in
society unless it can be logically traced back to the people through their
legislative representatives.
Two related ideas are inherent in the republican principle. First, the
principle implicitly recognizes that no one person or group is likely to have
a monopoly on political wisdom, at least for any extended length of time.
Hence, a political mechanism is required that assures frequent evaluation
of government policies by the governed through new elections or other-
wise. Political pluralism is not only contemplated, but is regarded as a
positive virtue. In a pluralistic society one political faction is less likely to
gain control and impose its ideas and policies on the rest of society. Sec-
ondly, the republican principle presupposes a free interchange of political
ideas. Without such interchange, the rest of the political apparatus is
likely to falter or to come within the grasp of a tyrannical faction.
A discussion of the republican principle easily leads to a discussion of
the legal monopoly principle. Only the legislature can make law. This
license does not preclude a delegation of power to other governmental
functionaries, however, provided sufficient direction is given to insure that
their discretionary acts are clearly in furtherance of the legislature's poli-
cies. This delegation may be implied in appropriate circumstances.
Clearly, however, no other person or group within society can legitimately
be coerced through the power of the law. Labor unions, churches, business
corporations, political associations, and universities cannot make binding
law.
The legal monopoly principle also espouses that only two politically and
legally relevant social entities exist in society, the individual and the state.
The individual, who is naturally free, has political and legal rights and can
create new rights and obligations by contract or other voluntary act. The
state, as the collective instrument of the citizenry, has the power to create
and modify rights and obligations on behalf of the people. Again, such
entities as the family, the church, business enterprises, and educational in-
stitutions have no power to create or modify legal rights and duties.
The design principle complements the monopoly principle. Since only
duly elected legislators can enact laws by following the appropriate
majoritarian machinery, all laws must be deliberately created. No law can
exist in areas where the legislature has not acted, nor can laws ever change
except through legislative action. Law itself, including constitutional law,
is an instrument consciously designed to achieve certain ends by control-
ling the behavior of individuals through rules. The design principle rules
out any idea that law can be derived from custom, history, or social mores.
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This theory does not necessarily mean that natural law or the law of God
cannot exist, or that the law of the state (positive law) may not reflect or in
some way imitate the higher law, merely that these are questions of theol-
ogy and philosophy. They are not a part of the liberal synthesis. In the
liberal view the law that political theory must deal with as a practical mat-
ter is the positive law whose origin is traceable to the will of society's
majority.
Finally, the rule of law is a comprehensive notion that completes our
description of the liberal synthesis. This idea, sometimes called the princi-
ple of legality38 or the RechIsstaat,39 initially means that society's political
power should be and is organized in accordance with general principles. A
constitutive framework must designate the specific powers allocated to
governmental officials. This delegation of powers can be accomplished
through a single written constitution, through a series of authoritative doc-
uments, through the actual practice of widely known and understood con-
ventions, or through some combination thereof. The imperative
requirement is that persons charged with running the government derive
their powers from general rules, and the legitimacy of their actions are
limited by those rules; as John Marshall said, "a government of laws, and
not of men."''4 Of course, these constitutive rules derive their legitimacy
from the republican principle, and as a further corollary, governmental
action, to be legitimate, must conform to whatever procedural rules are
prescribed. Thus, the legislature cannot pass a law without a majority
vote; the president cannot make law by decree; a court cannot pronounce
judgment in a case without giving the parties their day in court. These
kinds of limitations by rule constitute due process of law in its broadest
sense.
The rule of law in the liberal synthesis entails a subordinate but impor-
tant notion that government must be so organized that power is exercised
through functionally divided institutions, through the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial arms. A mixing of functions can lead to unwarranted
concentration of power in one person or group of persons with the risk of
abuse and thus loss of individual freedoms. The separation of powers is a
practical method of assuring that due process in the broad sense is ob-
served through checks and balances. The province of the legislator is to
decide what the legal rules will be. The province of the court is to apply
them to individual cases. For a legislature to impose legal liability ad hoc
in individual cases would be violative of its own constitutive rules. For a
court to attempt to act arbitrarily in disregard of the law, or to attempt to
make new law, or to attempt to change the legislative policy through inter-
pretation would be inconsistent with both the republican principle and the
rule of law. Judges are bound by the law.
38. J. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 2-7; H.L.A. HART, PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(1967), reprinted in D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 136-39; see also G. DELVECCHIO, PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW 454 (1953).
39. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 105, 148 (1969).
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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A related idea implicit in the rule of law is the principle of nullapoene
sine lege;41 no individual can be subjected to laws retroactively or to secret
laws. Penal laws are to be construed narrowly in favor of the accused.
Legislation must have a prospective application, must be promulgated in
clear and unmistakable terms, and must not be twisted or modified by
courts in its application. This principle clearly favors legislation over
judge-made law, and, indeed, favors comprehensive codification.42
Law must also take the form of general rules applied evenhandedly.
The principle of reciprocity, also called reversibility or the veil of igno-
rance,43 is a central requirement of the rule of law. Rules must be made
and applied in such a way that what is required of or given to one person
today may be required of or given to another in the same situation to-
morrow. To be fair, any rule or principle of decision should be fashioned
as though the rulemaker did not know to whom his rule applied, including
the possibility that it might apply to himself.
The foregoing brief outline of the liberal synthesis may be summarized
as follows: Legitimate governments are established through the consent of
the individuals in society; their political representatives have the only
power to make law that is a deliberately designed instrument to achieve
social objectives; the only entities in the social universe having political
and legal powers are the individual and the state; the powers of the state
must be separated into the legislative, judicial, and executive, and all gov-
ernment officials are subject to the rule of law. These concepts are both
descriptive and prescriptive. They constitute both the conceptual frame-
work through which we understand society and the standard for evaluat-
ing any given society.
D. The Task of Jurisprudence Under the Liberal Synthesis
The task of jurisprudence or legal theory under the liberal synthesis fol-
lows from the logic of the synthesis itself. Law is a deliberately con-
structed instrument intended to control the behavior of people in society.
It alone is authoritative and legitimate, and carries coercive sanctions.
Care must be taken to assure that social policies, political concepts, and
norms of morality that do not originate with the legitimate lawgiver are
not given authoritative sanction. To sanction such authority would consti-
tute an invasion of freedom never consented to by the individual. The task
of legal scholarship is to help preserve freedom from usurpation by or-
ganizing the vast array of legal rules, doctrines, and sources in an intelligi-
ble way that clearly defines the law.
41. Credit for articulation of this principle is attributed to Cesar Beccaria. C. BEC-
CARIA, ESSAY ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENTS (1764), reprinted in M. COHEN & F. COHEN,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 346 (1951).
42. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 38, at 27-34; see also Pound, Codification in Anglo-
American Law in THE CODE NAPOLEON AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 267 (B. Schwartz
ed. 1956)




This organizational task is twofold. First, the modern legal theory must
unmistakably identify the law to determine legally binding rules or princi-
ples of behavior. Under this prong of jurisprudential effort must come an
explanation of the connection between the rules of law, which are of
course authoritative and potentially coercive, and the legitimate political
power established by the republican principle. Secondly, jurisprudence
must clarify the mass of legal rules and principles to insure its proper un-
derstanding and use. This clarification proceeds in two directions. In one
direction, law must be broken down logically into component parts by
classification and subclassification, for example, criminal law and civil law,
procedural law and substantive law, commercial law and family law. In
the other direction, isolated individual rules of law and discrete doctrines
of law must be synthesized and interrelated into broader classifications to
enhance consistency and comprehension. Comprehension necessitates
some degree of system. The first method of clarification is analysis; the
second is exegesis or synthesis. Both methods are necessary to make the
instrument of law workable.
In performing its identification function, legal theory under the liberal
synthesis must attack the notion that morality, religious doctrine, natural
law, political doctrine, custom, good taste, or other sources of normative
rules of behavior can have the force of law. To recognize that legal obliga-
tion could emanate from these sources would be contrary to the republican
principle and the legal monopoly principle. Jurisprudence must, therefore,
erect a definitive intellectual barrier dividing that which is legal from that
which is merely moral, customary, or socially preferred. The positivistic
identification of law has traditionally been accomplished by a definition or
set of definitional concepts that establish the rules of law as those posited
or set forth to control human behavior by the sovereign. From this con-
nection with political ideology, positive law derives its dual nature as both
prescriptive and descriptive. Positive law is binding or valid precisely be-
cause it has the imprimatur of the republican principle, but this is also the
reason why it is law.
This theoretical position, the modem view of law, does not necessarily
entail the notion that the law is always right or desirable from everyone's
point of view. Indeed, the positivists favor the assertion that only when
law is clearly identified can it be subjected to moral or social criticism.
This kind of evaluation of law from outside the system Bentham called
censorial jurisprudence, as opposed to expository jurisprudence. 44 Under
the liberal synthesis any particular law or scheme of regulation can be crit-
icized as nonuseful, morally wrong, wasteful, frivolous, counterproductive,
or violative of natural rights. Even if these criticisms are correct, however,
they do not affect the validity of the law. Only the legislature can do that.
Again, the liberal synthesis admits of a pluralistic political process, which
can sometimes produce bad policy and is often imperfect; but the principle
44. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION (1789), reprinted in C. Morris, supra note 6, at 273-74.
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that legitimate law can only come out of that political process remains
intact. This principle in turn means that the evaluation of law or parts of a
legal system on the basis of such criteria as utility, justice, natural law, or
intuition is a matter of public policy or politics to be resolved through the
political process. Censorial jurisprudence becomes simply political
discourse.
Conversely, evaluation of law in terms of internal consistency, faithful-
ness to legislative intent, conceptual clarity, and comprehensiveness in the
sense of providing a rule for every situation, is a matter for jurisprudence.
Thus, jurisprudence is solely expository. The province of jurisprudence is
conveniently limited to identification, analysis, and exegesis of the positive
law. It is an activity engaged in by legal scholars, and to a lesser extent,
when necessary, by lawyers and judges. It is an activity that requires long
training, high intelligence, and a considerable capacity for the use of words
and logic. By its very nature jurisprudence need not look beyond the law
library to perform its function.
E Legal Autonomy and Its Function
The ironclad separation of law from morality and politics, which the
modern jurisprudence demands, also gives the legal system autonomy. Le-
gal questions are rationally resolved by jurists according to juristic meth-
ods and postulates. Political questions are resolved through the rough and
tumble of politics. The two are not different in degree, but in kind. Be-
cause this autonomy can be achieved, legal systems can be described inde-
pendently from the political systems that create them. Further, a general
model or theory of legal systems can be constructed that will appropriately
explain all particular local or national systems. This model is the intellec-
tual expression or formulation of the modern theory of law, and the propo-
nents of the modern view, including the most recent respected authorities,
have accordingly set forth their theories as universally applicable.45
As noted earlier, the autonomy of the legal system demanded by the
modern view results in a theory of judicial decisionmaking that precludes
the introduction of political and moral considerations into legal argumen-
tation.4 6 The next step is to consider the logic of legal autonomy at the top
of the positivist pyramid and to inquire about its political function. The
key to understanding the role that autonomy plays in the modern theory
can be found by examining a puzzle pondered by all positivist theorists,
the difficulty of deriving normative propositions of law (statements carry-
ing legal obligation or "oughtness") from general descriptive statements
about society.47 How does law get its validity?48
45. H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 1-17; H. KELSEN, supra note 4, discussed in D.
LLOYD, supra note 4, at 307-14 (4th ed. 1979).
46. See the discussion supra under the heading "The Task of Jurisprudence Under the
Liberal Synthesis." Note that this stricture distorts the explanation of the judicial process.
47. Some clarification of terms is called for at this point. A theory, or at least a social
theory, is expressed in language. Language is composed of statements or propositions. Pro-
positions may be descriptive or normative. Descriptive propositions state what "is" and
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The modem view asserts that laws are valid normative propositions be-
cause they can be derived from a master rule that designates how laws are
made. How do we know that the master rule is valid? The answer has
created a dichotomy between the two leading positivist thinkers of the
twentieth century. According to Hans Kelsen the validity of the master
rule (Grundnorm) must be assumed or presupposed for any given legal sys-
tem and no possibility of empirical verification exists.49 This answer,
while straightforward, leaves us uneasy. H.L.A. Hart, influenced by a
more empirical tradition, takes a subtle and ingenious approach to the
question. According to Hart we are not permitted to ask whether the
master rule (rule of recognition) is valid; rather, we may only ask if it is in
fact observed in the society under consideration. 50 Thus, all the rules of a
legal system are valid; they are true in the sense of being derivative of
other rules. The master rule, however, is different. It is true or false as a
matter of fact; hence, in principle it is empirically verifiable. Even in
Hart's system only the master rule is empirically verifiable. Determining
whether a specific rule of the system is valid through any empirical test is
impossible.
From the point of view of simple logic, 51 how does Hart move from
factual premises to normative conclusions? His argument seems decep-
tively simple. In challenging the validity of a legal rule Hart merely fol-
hence can be true or false. Normative propositions state what "ought to be" and hence can
be right or wrong but never factually true or false. Consider two descriptive propositions:
(1) all Irishmen have red hair; and (2) a catfish is a mammal. Both statements assert the
truth of something. They do not purport to state what should be or should not be. The first
statement is empirically verifiable because its truth can be tested by obtaining factual infor-
mation. If we assume that we know the meaning of the terms catfish and mammal, then the
truth of the second statement is established by resort to logical argument from definition or
other premises and not by empirical verification.
Now consider the following normative proposition: John should promptly pay his bills.
This statement does not purport to assert whether John has paid or usually pays or will
promptly pay his bills. It does not assert anything about John's behavior; it makes an asser-
tion about what he ought to do. Since no assertion is made about anything factual, the
proposition cannot be empirically verified. The truth of the proposition can be established
by logic if we assume or are given certain premises, for example: All moral agents should
pay their bills promptly; John is a moral agent. In this sense the truth of a normative propo-
sition can be established. A premise must be found that is normative (contains "ought"
language) and for that reason cannot be subject to empirical verification. The truth of the
premise, of course, can be demonstrated by deductive argument from some broader norma-
tive premise. No point exists, however, in which the truth of any normative proposition can
be empirically established. Indeed, it aids clarification to call normative propositions that
can be correctly deduced from other propositions "valid" rather than "true" since "true"
may connote a factual basis. Apparently, David Hume was the first to explain what has
come to be called the "naturalist fallacy." D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE(1777), reprinted in D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 26. See generally V. PRATT, THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 90-93 (1978); C. TAYLOR, NEUTRALITY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1967),
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION 139, 162 (A. Ryan ed. 1973).
48. See E. PATTERSON, supra note 13, at 147-72, for a discussion of different jurispru-
dential approaches to the question of law and its validity.
49. Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1130 (1965),
reprinted in D. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 326. Harris, the English exponent of Kelsen's pure
theory, calls the master rule the "basic legal science fiat." J. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 70-81.
50. H.L.A. HART, supra note 4, at 102-07.
51. See supra note 47.
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lows its pedigree up the ladder to the master rule as illustrated in this very
simplified argument:
1. You must compensate X. (Why? 2 & 3)
2. You have injured X. (Fact)
3. "One causing injury to another must make compensation" is a
rule of the legal system. (Why? 4 & 5)
4. "One causing injury to another must make compensation" is a
rule enacted by R. (Fact)
5. Rules enacted by R are rules of the legal system. (Fact)
Statement 5 is presumably the rule of recognition. Its truth can be deter-
mined by empirically studying the society in question to determine
whether R's rules are generally regarded as comprising the legal system.
This argument is, however, fallacious. A more careful analysis reveals
that the normative element represented by the "must" in statement 1 (the
conclusion) has been surreptitiously introduced through the ambiguity of
language in statement 3. The argument can be properly reconstructed as
follows:
I You are legally bound to compensate X. (Why? 2 & 3)
2 . You have injured X. (Fact)
3 . "One causing injury to another must make compensation" is a
legally binding rule. (Why? 4 & 5)
4 . "One causing injury to another must make compensation" is a
rule enacted by R. (Fact)
5 . Rules enacted by R are legally binding. (Why? 6 & 7)
6 . Rules enacted by R are generally regarded as obligatory in this
society. (Fact)
7a. Rules generally regarded as obligatory in this society are legally
binding. (Assumption)
7b. A legally binding rule means a rule enacted by someone whose
rules are generally regarded as obligatory in this society.
(Definition)
Thus, we can see that a normative premise must accompany the purported
master rule (statement 6) in order for normative conclusions to follow.
The normative premise may be assumed (statement 7a) in the manner of
Kelsen, or it may be a definition (statement 7b) as Hart seems to suggest.
As reconstituted, nothing is logically wrong with the argument.
Why should we use these assumptions or definitions to support our the-
ory when a more straightforward answer would be to supply the normative
content for law with a normative political statement? For example, sup-
pose that instead of being a definition or assumption, proposition 7 in the
argument above is offered as a political proposition. Thus, in a liberal
society propositions 6 and 7 might be restated and the argument continued
as follows:
6. R is a representative assembly elected by the people. (Fact)
7. A representative assembly elected by the people makes rules that
are legally binding. (Why? 8 & 9)
8. Rules that are legally binding can only be made by consent.
(Why? .0 & 11)
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9. A representative assembly elected by the people can consent to
the imposition of rules on behalf of the people. (Why? 12 & 13)
Further propositions would presumably be drawn from the realm of polit-
ical theory. Thus, the propositions that persuasively support the master
rule and provide the normative basis of legal validity are political proposi-
tions. Legal argument converges upon and becomes political argument.
The validity of law depends upon the validity of the political system.52
Unfortunately, this simple and straightforward way of justifying the
normative content of law runs afoul of that important component of the
liberal synthesis, the rule of law. Once we admit that legal propositions
derive their validity from political propositions, we are forced to examine
the hierarchy of political principles to determine whether a potential con-
tradiction exists between any of these principles and legal rules. There
may, indeed, be no hierarchy. Possibly, in given circumstances some polit-
ical principle may even conflict with the rule of recognition (or
Grundnorm). If a moral or political principle of great weight, for example,
the right to life, comes in conflict with a mere rule of law like the prohibi-
tion against physicians performing abortions, which shall prevail? If we
find that the legislature that enacted all the laws of 1976 was not democrat-
ically constituted, that is, constituted according to the republican principle,
does this mean that those laws are not law? Why not? Recourse to polit-
ical propositions as guides to behavior or judicial decision would involve
inquiry into vague norms that shade from principles into policies, which in
turn are goal oriented and hence come into conflict with other goals and
policies at some point.5 3 Law and politics apparently become one impene-
trable morass. Recall that one of the two tasks of jurisprudence under the
liberal synthesis is to identify what counts as law. Only one criterion of
identification can be admitted. In the modern view there can be only one
Grundnorm. Otherwise official power would not be limited by legal rule,
but by political expediency. 54
Another aspect of the rule of law, the separation of powers, also mili-
tates against deriving the validity of law from politics. In the modern the-
ory political principles and policies guide lawmakers; law guides judges.
Legislators are free to fashion rules toward whatever ends they see fit.
Judges are bound to decide cases according to law. If political and legal
propositions are essentially the same thing, the distinction between legisla-
tion and adjudication becomes attenuated. The modern theory requires
then, in the interests of its own consistency, that the legal system be auton-
omous. This perceived autonomy may have some important psychological
and social effects. Policymakers are insulated from the consequences of
their policies, with the result that political criticism of judges is regarded as
inappropriate. While the congressman's image may be that of "one of
52. This is the position of Marxist theory on this point. See infra text accompanying
notes 64-72.
53. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 82-84.
54. See infra the discussion of Soviet theory accompanying notes 68-75.
19821
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
those fools in Washington," the judge's image is that of the impartial dis-
penser of justice who must apply the law as written, however foolish that
law may be. The lawyer or jurist is similarly insulated from the moral or
political criticism reserved for politicians because his energies are confined
to the law.
III. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MODERN THEORY
The liberal synthesis and the view of law that developed with it are not
simply theoretical constructs or the playthings of academics. They have
been institutionalized in the structure of western society's legal systems.
Much of constitutional law incorporates the concepts of the liberal synthe-
sis; for example, the separation of powers, the subordination of judicial
decisions to legislative will, due process, and majority rule. These doc-
trines and principles of our system are established in enactment, judicial
interpretation, treatise, and practice. Public debate of political issues as-
sumes the instrumental character of law and the unquestioned validity of
the democratic process. Legal argument and legal opinion demand justifi-
cation in terms of authoritative rules with their appropriate pedigree.
The educational process has also contributed to the institutionalization
of the modern view. In secondary schools and colleges our system of gov-
ernment is taught mainly as liberal ideology, and the corresponding model
of law as the rational instrument of political authority is implied or af-
firmed.55 The principal, if not exclusive, means of achieving social change
today is thought to be through the enactment of new legislation.
In the law schools, however, the modern view receives its most impor-
tant sustenance. Like the medieval monks who preserved and transmitted
theoretical learning in the dark ages, the law faculties indoctrinate suc-
ceeding generations into the mysteries of the positivistic viewpoint, not
through the overt teaching of jurisprudential theory, but through example,
technique, and inference. 56 In the law schools the neophyte lawyer is
plunged into the logical games of analysis and exegesis, usually called le-
gal reasoning, in which the body of rules laid down by appropriate author-
ity is examined, dissected, compared, extended, and distinguished. 57 He is
55. See, e.g., two texts commonly used in undergraduate political science courses: F.
HARRIS, AMERICA'S DEMOCRACY: THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY (1980); S. PATTERSON, R.
DAVIDSON & R. RIPLEY, A MORE PERFECT UNION (1979). These texts are not uncritical,
but they clearly criticize from the viewpoint of the liberal synthesis.
56. See Cohen, Toward Radical Reform of the Law School Curriculum, 24 J.L. EDUC.
210 (1972); Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors." Notes on the Mar-
gins of Professional Training in the Public Interest, 54 VA. L. REV. 617 (1968); Symposium on
Current Trends in Legal Education, 50 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 434 (1976).
57. The editor of the first law school casebook, Christopher Columbus Langdell, ex-
plained the use of the case method:
Law considered as a science consists of certain principles or doctrines. To
have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs is what constitutes a
true lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business of every
earnest student of law. Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state
by slow degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases
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taught that he must have an understanding of these rules and the ways in
which they can be manipulated, because courts make decisions based upon
them and legislation is drafted in accordance with them.
Viewing what the lawyer must know as a regime of interrelated rules is a
very efficient organizing principle. The organization may be at a low level
of abstraction with the interrelationships between categories being omit-
ted, such as we see in legal encyclopedias and digests ("abatement" to
"zoning"); or, more typical of continental law teaching, higher categories
may be synthesized by rational process until great overriding legal con-
cepts are arrived at ("juridical act," "subjective right").58 The organiza-
tional framework engendered by this view is determined by logical
connection and is not necessarily related to either social context or the
lawyer's tasks. Thus, such diverse human activities as purchasing a refrig-
erator, agreeing to play baseball for pay, and playing a slot machine are all
subsumed under the conceptual heading of contract. Most of the subjects
of law are taught today in courses organized along these conceptual lines.
This method has the great advantage of making a large body of law ra-
tional and hence usable.
Precision in thinking is perhaps the greatest contribution that the mod-
em view has made toward the teaching of lawyering. An insistence on the
careful use of language and an ability to manipulate legal terms and con-
cepts are indispensable requirements for any lawyer. Argumentation
within a closed system is clearly one of the most important of lawyerly
skills. The law schools spend much time in making students analyze cases
and interpret statutory materials. Indeed, the hallmark of the law school
seems to lie in the dialectic of legal propositions as taught through the
Socratic method.
Learning the law in the law schools is thus analogous to learning to play
a very intellectual game. 59 The heart of this game is argumentation within
loosely delineated boundaries. The argumentation itself is important, not
the result of the argument. A law student is taught to pride himself on
being able to argue both sides of an issue equally well. Broad questions of
policy or justice, while occasionally referred to, are basically outside the
scope of inquiry. This approach tends to result in little or no connection
between the thinking of social scientists, historians, and philosophers, and
the thinking of legal scholars. The modem, positivistic view of law is not
broad enough to take into account the perspectives of other disciplines.
Social scientists, historians, and philosophers, using their own particular
through centuries. This growth is to be traced in the main through a series of
cases; and much the shortest and best, if not the only way of mastering the
doctrine effectually is by studying the cases in which it is embodied.
C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Introduction (1871).
58. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 39, at 78, 81.
59. This generalization of course overlooks efforts in many American law schools today
to emphasize an awareness of moral and social issues as well as to learning the skills of
lawyering. While these efforts expand the scope of law school education, just as often they
assume a positivistic notion of law itself.
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methodologies, seek to find the truth. Academic lawyers, in contrast, seek
to work out the logic of their own doctrines drawn from the basic authori-
tative rules postulated by the system.60 Thus we can see how the modem
view of law is perpetuated in spite of much valid criticism. It has been
institutionalized in the constitution and the traditions of legal practice as
well as in the educational structure.
IV. APPROPRIATION OF THE MODERN THEORY
While the liberal synthesis continues to be the dominant political ideol-
ogy in many western countries, the twentieth century has seen considerable
erosion of the ideology. For some political thinkers one brand or another
of Marxism has wholly supplanted the liberal synthesis. Fascism, tempo-
rarily at home in Germany and Italy in the 1930s, is apparently still an
accepted political world view in some of the emergent Asian and African
nations and perhaps elsewhere. In the United States democratic relativism
seems to have affected, if not modified, the more traditional liberalism at
the academic level.61 Strangely enough, however, modern legal theory
seems almost as healthy as ever. It is as though liberalism had created an
efficient machine, and then the machine was duplicated through some sort
of clandestine espionage and put to work for other masters. This Franken-
stein phenomenon merits closer examination.
As earlier noted, the modem theory of law has grown up as a philosophy
congruent and complementary to the liberal synthesis. This political syn-
thesis consisted of four main principles: the republican principle, the legal
monopoly principle, the design principle, and the rule of law. The princi-
ples of legal monopoly and design have a strong appeal to any political
movement that wishes to establish a new type of society and to throw off
the shackles of previous regimes. 62 A perspective that sees law as the ex-
clusive instrument of state policy unrestrained by any notions of natural
law, religious doctrine, or local custom is certainly agreeable to the aims of
most revolutionaries. Instead of the republican principle, however, some
notion of true and good political leadership by an elite is offered as a sub-
stitute. The underlying political theory is, of course, substantially changed
thereby, but the exclusive and instrumental nature of law remains attrac-
tive. With appropriate legislative modifications in policy, the same ma-
chinery that serves liberalism can serve socialist legality, nationalism,
fascism, or other political ideologies. Indeed, this conversion seems to be
what has happened. 63
This explanation is, however, too simplified for the appropriation of the
60. See J. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 70-106. Considerable empirical research has also
been done in recent years by legal scholars, particularly with the support of the American
Bar Foundation. These scholars, however, represent a small minority of legal academics.
61. E. PURCELL, supra note 18, at 235.
62. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 157
(1968).




modem theory by Marxist theorists, since there is more to be said about
law in the Marxist view than the modem theory would admit.64 A brief
examination of the Marxist ideology is therefore in order.65 According to
this ideology, law is the instrument of the ruling class and is used to per-
petuate that class in power. Law is also one of those aspects of culture,
however, that is determined by the type of economy, or means of produc-
tion, underlying any given society. Thus, a society with a feudal economy
will have feudal law, a capitalist economy will have a capitalist law, and a
socialist economy will have a socialist law. While the type of economy
determines the type of law, the law can be used as the instrument of a
revolutionary ruling group along with such other instruments as education,
propaganda, and military force to change conditions in society in order to
hasten the progress toward a new type of economy. The ultimate economy
and society that mankind will move into is communism, in which each
person contributes according to his abilities and receives according to his
needs. At this point law and the state will wither away because they are no
longer needed. This withering away concept, even if taken seriously, need
not concern us since the Marxists themselves have not recently speculated
about it.
What does concern us is the status of law in the Marxist countries of
today.66 According to Soviet theorists, the Soviet Union has moved from
the dictatorship of the proletariat established by the 1917 revolution to "a
state of all the people."' 67 This is a transitional stage of development that
will eventually lead to true communism. The political apparatus of the
state is under the control of the Communist Party, which is an elite com-
posed of those who supposedly understand the future of society and are
committed to lead the country in the right direction. Until all of the peo-
ple, including the workers, reach a stage of consciousness in which they
can understand their true destiny, they cannot be allowed to interfere with
or participate in the making and carrying out of social policy. Law and the
state, along with the other instruments of social control, must therefore be
maintained until the appropriate social conditions have been attained. For
the Marxist, then, an elite such as the Communist Party is regarded as the
legitimate political authority in socialist society. This part of Marxist the-
ory, the main political part, replaces the republican principle of the liberal
synthesis. The design principle and legal monopoly principle are com-
pletely accepted. Thus, the modern theory of law, except for the connec-
64. In contrast, Fascism apparently never developed any sophisticated jurisprudence.G. LICHTHEIM, supra note 26, at 225-37; see also Rudden, supra note 26, at 189.
65. This summary overview is taken primarily from R. SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL
THEORY 1-36, 243-73 (2d ed. 1951), as updated by R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, supra note 62, at
122-204, and J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 5-14 (1977).
See also J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 3-144 (1969); Rudden, supra note 26.
66. We do not attempt here to consider the emerging views of the Chinese communists,
which may well vary fundamentally from those held in the Eastern European communist
countries. See J. HAZARD, supra note 65, at 519-28.
67. J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, supra note 65, at 8-9.
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tion with the liberal principle of the rule of law, is congruent to Marxist
political theory.
Although the Soviets acknowledge the principle of socialist legality, 68
whether this is roughly equivalent to the rule of law, perhaps with an ex-
tra-egalitarian slant, is unclear. Lenin did say, "[Law] is politics," 69 and,
of course, the police state practices of the Soviet Government over the
years raise serious questions about whether even socialist legality is any
real part of the Soviet philosophy. Clearly, though, the Supreme Soviet,
the guiding political body at the national level, is above the law. 70 Other
features of the official Soviet system, such as the "comrades' courts" and
the constitutional duty to respect the "rules of socialist human inter-
course," 71 suggest the possibility of officially sanctioned conduct that has
the potential of being contrary to law.
Assuming that the rule of law is substantially less secure as a political
principle in the Soviet Union than in western countries, what effect does
that have on the acceptance of the modern view of law? Several possible
consequences may arise. The legal system will certainly be viewed as less
than autonomous;72 separation of powers will be rejected or will take a
different form;73 retroactive laws, including criminal laws, may be justi-
fied; and official acts, especially at higher levels of government, will not be
limited by constitutional or legal rules.74 Law will take on a definite polit-
ical caste and will be much less important in the culture of Soviet society
than in countries with a tradition of the rule of law. Except for the last
point, each of these propositions suggests a possible jurisprudential prob-
lem because of its potential inconsistency with the remainder of the mod-
em theory of law. We would, therefore, expect that jurisprudential inquiry
in the Soviet Union would be pursued along these avenues. 75
In the meantime some version of the modern view of law is alive and
healthy around the world. Indeed, one of the first western institutions that
emergent nations have adopted in their efforts to modernize and promote
economic development is a positivistic conception of law and legislation.76
The rational, instrumental, secular, and monopolistic attributes of the
modern theory are compelling to those who would restructure society.
68. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, supra note 62, at 193-94. Socialist legality is explained
thus: "Soviet citizens must obey Soviet laws because they are just; and they are just because
the state is a socialist state which exists in the interests of all and not that of a privileged
class." Id.
69. J. HAZARD, W. BUTLER & P. MAGGS, supra note 65, at 5.
70. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, supra note 62, at 210.
71. Id. at 254; Rudden, supra note 26, at 191-204.
72. Roberto Unger makes the same conclusions regarding what he calls the
"postliberal" society. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 192-223 (1976).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Some of these issues are indeed discussed in the authorities cited supra note 65.
76. For a thought provoking discussion of this phenomenon, see L. FRIEDMAN, THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 218-22 (1975).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF REJECTING THE MODERN THEORY
This Article has attempted to demonstrate the conceptual congruence of
the modem theory with political ideology, and has suggested that the ac-
ceptance of the political ideology has entailed acceptance of the legal the-
ory. The final question for consideration is whether rejection of positivism
also entails rejection of the liberal synthesis or modem political ideology
generally. That question is answered by adverting to six of the most im-
portant criticisms77 traditionally leveled at the modem theory and by con-
sidering their implications for political theory as well. As stated before,
these criticisms are here accepted as essentially valid.78
1. The modem theory of law is nonempirical and nonscientific; hence,
it cannot lead to explanation of causal relationships or scientific laws. This
criticism suggests, although it does not prove, that the liberal synthesis it-
self is unscientific. This proposition is hardly startling, and, even if true, it
does not undermine the integrity of the liberal synthesis or its capacity to
organize our thoughts about political life. To the extent that it purports to
be descriptive of actual legal systems, however, a nonscientific political
theory does not have the attractive feature of self-correction through em-
pirical verification that all scientific theories enjoy.
2. The modem theory of law cannot explain nondeliberate change in
law. Something is seriously wrong with the design principle if law can
change significantly over long, and sometimes shorter, periods of time
without deliberate guidance or calculation by human beings, and as a re-
sult people are coerced or brought into conformity with policies and rules
that no individual, much less the legislature, has designed. A failure of the
design principle in turn entails a failure of the republican principle.
3. The modem theory of law is ethnocentric folklore peculiar to certain
western societies. This charge suggests that the liberal synthesis, or per-
haps more broadly, modem political ideology, is ethnocentric. Being eth-
nocentric does not undermine the validity of the theory for its use and
application in our own society, but it does suggest that alternative or more
comprehensive political and legal theory is necessary to account for what
happens in quite different societies. It also implies that the moral and
political values incorporated in the liberal synthesis are culturally relative.
This does not rule out the possibility that certain values are absolute and
are found in all societies, but moral skepticism is also consistent with this
view.
4. The modern theory of law fails to recognize the operation of legal
processes, other than the official ones, in society. Various groups and orga-
nizations in society generate their own law through rule-making and rule-
applying. Members of these groups are coerced into conforming to such
law under the threat of expulsion or other sanctions. The legal monopoly
77. See supra notes 3-25 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 12 & 25.
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principle is thus constantly violated. Since this principle derives from the
republican principle, it too is violated.
5. Administrative agencies and many units of local government com-
bine adjudication, policymaking, and administration in the same body,
sometimes using the same procedures. In addition, they often make regu-
lations having the force of law without any real guidance from legislative
mandates. The modern theory of law must resort to fictions to bring the
operation of these agencies within its ambit. In fact, the separation of
powers aspect of the rule of law is violated by the combined adjudicative-
legislative practice, and the legal monopoly principle is violated by the
largely unchecked lawmaking discretion of these agencies.
6. Finally, judicial decisionmaking cannot be adequately explained by
the modern theory of law. The outcome of litigation is often, if not always,
the result of a number of factors that are nonlegal in the positivist sense.
Judges and juries use their own ideas of justice, of economic reality, and of
other subjective notions in arriving at decisions. Principles of fairness and
morality common to the community play a part and often prevail over
legal rules. Thus, the parties to a case are often judged by and coerced by
nonlegal rules. Sometimes these rules are arrived at and announced in the
very case under consideration, so that they are in effect applied to the par-
ties' conduct retroactively. Such rules also carry over to subsequent cases
in the Anglo-American system through the doctrine of stare decisis.
This realistic view of judicial decisionmaking is contrary to all of the
principles of the liberal synthesis. It violates the republican principle be-
cause the judges, not the people's representatives, are making a part of the
law. It violates the legal monopoly principle because norms of decision
are drawn from community morality and perhaps unarticulated subjective
notions of fairness. It violates the design principle for the same reason.
The rule of law is violated because rules are sometimes applied retroac-
tively, and judges both make and apply rules contrary to the separation of
powers.
This brief survey clearly indicates that the reasons for rejecting the mod-
em theory of law are also reasons for rejecting the liberal synthesis.79
While it may be relatively easy to shake loose from the old jurisprudence,
it may not be so easy to shake loose from our notions of democratic
government.
79. This was realized by some of the early critics of positivism in the United States.
Some seem to have lost their nerve or changed their positions. Unfortunately, the intellec-
tual battle at this time was fought not between positivism and realism, but between natural
law and realism with positivism often considered together with realism. For a fascinating
account of this bit of intellectual history, see E. PURCELL, supra note 18, at 159-218.
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